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IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS, by Dan Simon1
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE is a foundational principle of the modern 
criminal law throughout North America. Formal procedures governing the 
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication stages aim to ensure that only the 
truly guilty are convicted, while the innocent go free. Yet, over 250 people have 
been exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing since the late 1980s2 and it is 
likely that even more innocent people have been wrongfully convicted in cases 
where DNA evidence was either not available or not preserved.
Increased awareness of wrongful convictions has generated a growing body 
of literature examining the systemic and procedural failings of the criminal 
justice process. Dan Simon’s book, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice 
Process, provides powerful critiques of common criminal justice procedures using 
an extensive range of experimental psychology research. 
Chapter one proposes the significant importance of understanding how 
cognitive functions may lead to bias considering that “the criminal justice process 
is operationalized mostly through people.”3 The book is intentionally broad in 
scope and utilizes case examples largely for illustrative purposes. Simon ultimately 
seeks to explain just some of the pathological effects of human cognition on the 
administration of justice, which occur despite the best intentions of legal actors 
and agencies.
1. (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2012) 416 pages.
2. Brandon L Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 2011) at 5.
3. Supra note 1 at 2. 
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The following four chapters focus primarily on the criminal investigation 
stage. Chapter two examines dynamics within investigative procedures that 
might cause criminal investigators to unwittingly draw erroneous or premature 
conclusions. One such dynamic is the “inherent tension between an objective 
inquiry and an adversarial-like endeavor of building a case against the suspect.”4 
Investigation necessarily requires developing hypotheses to help resolve the 
uncertainties surrounding crimes. However, a focal hypothesis5 developed early 
on in the investigation is liable to lead to confirmation bias.6 An investigator may 
subconsciously be more disposed to attend to evidence that supports the focal 
hypothesis while rejecting evidence that contradicts it.7 Motivational factors 
(e.g., public and institutional pressures to solve crimes)8 may also support 
confirmation bias and intensify the biasing influence of another cognitive 
mechanism, the coherence effect.9 This mechanism causes mental grouping of 
pieces of evidence that individually are ambiguous, but once combined point 
toward a seemingly logical conclusion. This permits investigators to sort complex 
arrays of evidentiary information, but may also result in a loss of objectivity. 
Chapters three and four examine the biasing effects inherent in the use of 
witnesses. Studies have repeatedly shown that eyewitness identification is highly 
influenced by witnessing conditions10 and are highly susceptible to suggestive 
information during identification procedures, such as subtle differences in the 
phrasing of questions from the procedures’ administrators.11 This problem is 
exacerbated by the lack of procedural congruence amongst law enforcement 
agencies.12
4. Ibid at 25.
5. The focal hypothesis refers to the specific hypothesis which that the investigator’s focus, 
overriding other possible hypotheses. Simon relates the focal hypothesis to the “unwarranted 
conformity of incoming information to extant beliefs” (ibid at 22).
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid at 23-25.
8. Ibid at 26-27. Group influence acts as a motivation factor. Simon reports that “excessive 
cohesion” amongst members of a group (e.g., police agencies) can result in a pathological 
state called “groupthink” which can result in poor behaviour by its members and a perceived 
reduction of moral responsibility (ibid at 29).
9. Ibid at 33-36. Simon notes, “[t]his psychological phenomenon can be encapsulated by the 
Gestaltian notion that what goes together, must fit together” (ibid at 34). 
10. This refers to the specific conditions under which witnesses both view and later recall 
information. 
11. Ibid at 40.
12. Ibid at 142-43.
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Simon reviews the various errors that can occur during the memory 
processes of encoding, retention, and retrieval, often as a result of memory decay 
post-encoding.13 Where memories are incomplete or missing, witnesses may 
unconsciously produce false memories that result from either source confusion14 or 
from filling in memory gaps with their own schematic knowledge.15 Thus, witnesses 
may not be cognizant of the falsity of their own memories.16
Chapter five examines commonly used police interrogation techniques 
such as psychological coercion, which has proliferated in North America despite 
constitutional protections against coerced confessions.17 Research shows that 
psychological coercion can result in false confessions of guilt from innocent 
parties.18 
Chapters six and seven address limitations on the diagnostic capacity19 of 
adjudicators and adjudicative procedures.20 Numerous studies establish the 
biasing influences of unreliable evidence, the courtroom environment, and 
trial procedures. As per Simon, “errors beget errors.”21 Finders of fact rely on 
the evidence of investigators, which is likely to be rife with bias and erroneous 
information by the time it reaches the courtroom.22 The adversarial nature of the 
criminal trial and the procedures that purport to ensure fairness do little to ensure 
that evidence is presented and analyzed in a truthful manner accounting for the 
limitations and failings of the investigatory process.
Chapter eight concludes the book with a discussion of the marginalization 
of factual accuracy in the criminal justice system and the institutionally held 
denial of its failings. Simon demonstrates that, despite such denial, a vast array 
of empirical evidence demands procedural reforms in order for the justice system 
13. Ibid at 55, 66.
14. This occurs when individuals “mistakenly [recall] elements from one event as belonging to 
another event” (ibid at 97).
15. Ibid at 99-105. Schematic knowledge refers to an individual’s personal expectation of what is 
normal or typical. 
16. These can occur by spontaneous error or by inducement from external factors such as their 
interactions with others in the criminal process (ibid at 99-101).
17. Ibid at 132.
18. Ibid at 139-40.
19. This refers to the ability of the legal system and its agents to make factual determinations on 
the guilt or innocence of a person. It implies the ability to identify the relevant and accurate 
information from false information.
20. Ibid at 144.
21. Ibid at 208.
22. Ibid at 149, 177.
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to live up to its name.23 Accordingly, Simon’s In Doubt is highly illuminating for 
lawyers, adjudicators, or legal academics, and his explanatory approach makes it 
suitable for those with little or no prior education in the area of psychology. 
23. In each chapter, Simon includes recommendations for reforms to improve the transparency 
and accuracy of criminal investigative and adjudicative procedures, including standardized 
best-practice procedures premised on a better understanding of the available empirical 
knowledge.  
